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Abstract
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a significant contributor
to the growing concern of antibiotic resistant bacteria, especially given its stubborn
persistence in hospitals and other health care facility settings. In combination with
this characteristic of S. aureus (colloquially referred to as staph), MRSA presents
an additional barrier to treatment and is now believed to have colonized two of
every 100 people worldwide. According to the CDC, MRSA prevalence sits as high
as 25-50% in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Given
the resistant nature of staph as well as its capability of evolving to compensate
antibiotic treatment, controlling MRSA levels is more a matter of precautionary
and defensive measures. This study examines the method of "search and isolation,"
which seeks to isolate MRSA positive patients in a hospital so as to decrease
infection potential. Although this strategy is straightforward, the question of just
whom to screen is of practical importance. We compare screening at admission
to screening at discharge. To do this, we develop a mathematical model and use
simulations to determine MRSA endemic levels in a hospital with either control
measure implemented. We found that screening at discharge was the more effective
method in controlling MRSA endemicity, but at the cost of a greater number of
isolated patients.
Keywords — MRSA; Screening strategies; Infection control; Search and isolation;
Mathematical model
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1 Introduction
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a bacterium that colonizes the
skin of human beings as well as their proximate environment. Although this is intrinsi-
cally true for staph, antibiotic resistance has made eradication much more difficult. The
evolution of antibiotic resistance in staph, however, is not a new development. The dis-
covery of penicillin in the 1920s allowed for a very effective treatment for S. aureus and
other bacterial infections, remaining effective until only a few decades later when Bondi
and Dietz identified the enzyme penicillinase being produced by staph - completely nul-
lifying any power of the revolutionary antibiotic [2]. Currently, more than 90% of S.
aureus cultures are resistant to penicillin [21]. Methicillin was developed as a response
to penicillin resistance, but as early as the 1960s, the same decade it was developed,
MRSA had already been isolated in the United Kingdom. Fifty years following initial
isolation, MRSA has spread worldwide and has developed potent endemicity in health
care facilities across the United States and Europe. Currently, approximately 90,000
Americans suffer from MRSA infections every year with a mortality rate of 22% [29].
Since MRSA is both the most prevalent and the most destructive in hospital settings,
this is the context which the following paper assumes. Screening and isolation is a very
common control strategy implemented in hospitals battling MRSA outbreaks. Screening
typically involves the swabbing of the nares of a patient to determine colonization, and
is performed at admission. A positive result yields the placement of the patient into a
region of the hospital where bacterial spread is hindered, aptly termed an isolation unit
(IU). Here, further transmission of the bacteria is assumed to be zero. Preference may
or may not be given to certain patients with higher susceptibility to MRSA carriage,
including any individuals who have a history of hospital admission, have a history of
antibiotic use, belong to a certain age group, or possess an open wound or skin infection.
Recently, screening at discharge has been proposed as an alternative to screening at
admission.
Several mathematical models have attempted to capture the transmission dynamics
of MRSA in hospitals. Chamchod and Ruan present a compartmentalized model for
MRSA that considers patients as either uncolonized, colonized, or infectious [6]. Health
care workers (HCWs) exist in their own compartments as either contaminated or un-
contaminated and behave as vectors for the bacteria. Chamchod and Ruan consider
MRSA transmission dynamics in light of antibiotic usage and subsequent resistance.
Patients are considered at a higher risk of developing MRSA if they have a history of
antibiotic usage. Cooper et al. consider additionally the contributions of the community
to endemic levels in hospitals [7]. However, the community that Cooper et al. consider
is comprised entirely of previous hospital patients. The authors highlight that timing
of intervention, resource provision, isolation practices, and the correct combination of
procedures is the key to successful eradication. Bootsma et al. constructed two models
to study MRSA transmission: one model considers transmission within a single hospital,
while another model considers transmission within a system of hospitals [3]. In all of
the aforementioned models, screening, if any, is performed at admission.
MRSA is classified in accordance with where it originates: community-acquired
MRSA (CA-MRSA) and hospital-acquired MRSA (HA-MRSA). As a result of its persis-
tence and antibiotic resistance, MRSA is able to maintain endemic rates within health
care facilities for extended periods of time. MRSA hospital endemicity yields exorbitant
costs of treatment and precautions in lieu of effective antibiotic treatment. Hospitals
with high endemic rates become sources of infection instead of facilities for recovery.
Consequently, the attention of this research focuses on HA-MRSA only.
One aspect deserving elaboration is the notion of colonization. A patient is con-
sidered colonized when the bacteria is present on his physical person. Common places
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include the nares, throat, and groin [19]. Robicsek et al. estimate that MRSA coloniza-
tion half-life in a patient can be up to 40 months [24]. Carrying the bacteria is different
from being infected. Infection occurs when MRSA is allowed to enter the body, typi-
cally by way of skin lesions or wounds. Thus, from this information it can be inferred
that health care workers (HCWs) are the main carriers of MRSA, as they interact with
individual patients the most and are likely to be contaminated for longer periods of time
due to continuous exposure to the bacteria [1]. Following the example of Chamchod and
Ruan, HCWs will be considered separate from the patient population and treated as
vectors of the bacteria.
Screening is used to detect patients who have been colonized by MRSA. There is no
unique screening procedure followed by hospitals in general. Molecular techniques, such
as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods, are generally faster and more accurate
in comparison to culture techniques. Kunori et al. estimates that the former technique
is more expensive than the latter [20]. For the purposes of our study, we assume that
the hospital uses rapid MRSA testing. The question of just how many patients should
be screened is important. Universal screening-at-admission is costlier and generally in-
efficient. Roth et al. found that universal screening-at-admission costs over twice as
much as compared to alternative screening methods [25]. One such common alterna-
tive is targeted screening, whereby patients deemed at high-risk of developing MRSA
colonization/infection are screened. Such patients include those with frequent hospital
stays, a history of antibiotic usage, or are hospitalized with skin wounds/lesions.
Identification of MRSA carriers is critical in health care settings. It is no coinci-
dence then that optimizing how carriers are identified be of utmost importance. Using
three mathematical models, each addressing a particular system (control strategies ab-
sent, screening at admission, and screening at discharge), we compare the most favored
method of screening (that of admission) to screening at discharge in controlling nosoco-
mial transmission of MRSA by using a combination of qualitative and numerical analysis
methods to estimate reductions in the number of total contaminated and infected pa-
tients.
2 Methods
We used three mathematical models (both deterministic and stochastic) to explore differ-
ent control strategies for MRSA spread in hospitals. Each model is a system of nonlinear
differential equations. We developed a baseline model, which is a simple compartmental
model of MRSA in a hospital absent all other control strategies. Each screening strategy
is modeled similarly with corresponding changes to the baseline model. These changes
are explained in the subsections to follow.
2.1 Baseline model
Our model considers a town of 58, 000 with a single hospital of 600 beds and a health care
staff of 150 HCWs [6]. For the baseline model, patients are considered to be uncolonized
(U), colonized (C), or infected (I). A patient is colonized when MRSA bacteria is
present on his/her body, but the bacteria has not progressed to infection. Health care
workers (HCWs) are considered to be either uncontaminated (H) or contaminated (HC).
Admitted patients are either colonized or infected with proportions λC and λI , re-
spectively; they are uncolonized, otherwise. Our baseline model is represented by the
following system of ordinary differential equations:
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dH
dt
= δHC − βˆ1H C
N
− βˆ2H I
N
dHc
dt
= βˆ1H
C
N
+ βˆ2H
I
N
− δHc
dU
dt
= (1− λC − λI)Λ− (µU + γU )U − β1U C
N
− β2U Hc
NH
− β3U I
N
+ αC
dC
dt
= λCΛ− (µC + γC)C + β1U C
N
+ β2U
Hc
NH
+ β3U
I
N
− (φ+ α)C
dI
dt
= λIΛ− (µI + γI)I + φC
(1)
where β1 denotes the transmission rate between colonized and uncolonized patients, β2
refers to the transmission rate between contaminated HCWs and uncolonized patients,
and β3 is the transmission rate between infected and uncolonized patients. An uncol-
onized patient must first be colonized before becoming infected. µ and γ are used to
denote death and discharge/treatment rates of each compartment. φ is the rate at which
colonized patients become infected. Colonized patients are decolonized at a rate of α;
thus 1/α captures the average time of decolonization. 1/δ gives the average time an
HCW remains contaminated. βˆ1 is the rate of contamination between uncontaminated
HCWs and colonized patients, while βˆ2 denotes the transmission efficiency between un-
contaminated HCWs and infected patients.
The total population (N) is given as the sum of total HCWs (NH) and total patients
(NP ). NH is assumed constant, as well as NP . This latter assumption can be made
with the correct choice of Λ, or the rate at which patients are admitted into the hospital.
A patient is admitted into the hospital whenever an existing patient leaves, either by
death or discharge. For the baseline model, Λ = (µU + γU )U+(µC + γC)C+(µI + γI) I.
With these assumptions, the total population within the hospital is constant.
Patients and HCWs are assumed to mix homogeneously. Strictly speaking, the as-
sumption of homogeneous mixing can be challenged, since most patients are confined to
their rooms for the majority of their hospital stay and do not necessarily contact other
patients directly. However, they may be in contact with equipment and surfaces, and
thus have the potential to indirectly contaminate both HCWs and other patients. We
consider these indirect contacts when calculating transmission rates.
There are two assumed mechanisms of contamination for uncontaminated health
care workers. The first mechanism is contact with colonized patients while the second
mechanism is contact with infected patients. We assume that a health care worker does
not become contaminated from other HCWs [4, 27]. Because it is possible for a HCW to
become contaminated more than once in the same day, we do not account for frequency
of particular patient contacts. The baseline compartmental model is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Baseline model diagram.
2.2 Screening at admission
For the model for screening at admission, we maintain the structure of the baseline model
with the addition of the isolation compartment, denoted by Z, henceforth referred to as
the isolation unit (IU). For simplicity, we assume that the IU has infinite capacity. If
a patient is tested positive for MRSA at admission, he/she will be moved to the IU for
the remainder of his/her time in the hospital. Successful screening occurs at proportion
ρ. No distinction is made between infected and colonized patients when screened for
MRSA. Only newly admitted patients may be placed in the IU, with the exception
being an identified infected patient in the hospital according to some rate κ. 1/κ is
taken to be the sum of the average incubation period of MRSA infection (4.5 days) and
the average duration of culture and sensitivity testing (2.5 days according to [15]). The
model representing the aforementioned MRSA hospital dynamics is as follows:
dH
dt
= δHC − βˆ1H C
N
− βˆ2H I
N
dHc
dt
= βˆ1H
C
N
+ βˆ2H
I
N
− δHc
dU
dt
= (1− λC − λI)Λ− (µU + γU )U − β1U C
N
− β2U Hc
N
− β3U I
N
+ αC
dC
dt
= λCΛ(1− ρ)− (µC + γC)C + β1U C
N
+ β2U
Hc
N
+ β3U
I
N
− (φ+ α)C
dI
dt
= λIΛ(1− ρ)− (µI + κ)I + φC
dZ
dt
= (λC + λI)Λρ+ κI − (µZ + γZ)Z
(2)
For this model, Λ = (µU + γU )U + (µC + γC)C + (µI) I + (µZ + γZ)Z. Note that
patients infected with MRSA are not discharged, but are treated in isolation. As with the
baseline model, the population remains constant. Note also that we omit consideration
of Z regarding transmission between contaminated and uncontaminated groups. This
is because we assume that Z  N . Admitted patients tested positive for MRSA move
into the IU at a rate given by (λC + λI)ρΛ. Patients in isolation are assumed to die at
a rate of µZ and are discharged/treated at a rate of γZ . Patients infected with MRSA
are not treated outside the IU. The schematic for this system is given in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Screening at admission model diagram.
2.3 Screening at discharge
In order to reformulate the model so as to consider screening at discharge, we com-
partmentalize the community in terms of flagged (F ) and unflagged (FU ) individuals.
Patients are flagged if they test positive for MRSA at discharge, and are unflagged oth-
erwise. Patients who are flagged, when readmitted to the hospital, are placed in the
isolated compartment. Our model then becomes:
dH
dt
= δHC − βˆ1H C
N
− βˆ2H I
N
dHC
dt
= βˆ1H
C
N
+ βˆ2H
I
N
− δHc
dU
dt
= (1− λC − λI)Λ
( FU
kF + FU
)
− (µU + γU )U − β1U C
N
− β2U HC
N
− β3U I
N
+ αC
dC
dt
= λCΛ
(
FU
kF + FU
)
− (µC + γC)C + β1U C
N
+ β2U
HC
N
+ β3U
I
N
− (φ+ α)C
dI
dt
= λIΛ
(
FU
kF + FU
)
− (µI + κ)I + φC
dZ
dt
= Λ
( kF
kF + FU
)
+ κI − (µZ + γZ)Z
dF
dt
= ρ(γCC + (1− τ)γZZ)− Λ
( kF
kF + FU
)
− µFF
dFU
dt
= (1− ρ)(γCC + (1− τ)γZZ) + γUU + τγZZ − Λ
(
FU
kF + FU
)
− µFUFU + bFU
(3)
In addition to the previous model, success of patient treatment is included. Proportion τ
of treatments are successful of complete eradication and fail otherwise. We also consider
the factor k, which represents the number of times more likely that a flagged patient is
to be readmitted to the hospital as compared to an unflagged patient. Consequently, the
total admission into the hospital is given by Λ = (µU + γU )U + (µI) I + (µC + γC)C +
(µZ + γZ)Z in order to retain a constant hospital population. The unflagged population
is comprised of the wider community as well as patients who were not identified as
MRSA-positive when they were discharged from the hospital. Recruitment rate and
death rate for the unflagged group are denoted by bFU and µFU , respectively. Individuals
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in the flagged compartment die at a rate of µF . The birth and death rates of the
community were chosen so that the community population is asymptotically constant.
The disease dynamics of this model is represented graphically in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Screening at discharge model diagram.
2.4 Parameter estimation
All model parameters are defined, and estimates given, in Tables 1 and 2. Several
parameters discussed prior deserve further elaboration, contained within this subsection.
For β2, the transmission rate between contaminated HCWs and uncolonized patients, we
assumed that patients could not be colonized more than once during a single day, and
that patients only make (direct) contact with HCWs (note that this is not contradictory,
as patients can contact other patients via indirect means, such as shared surfaces).
Reference [14] reports that HCWs make 7.6 contacts per patient per day. The proportion
of successful transmission is taken to be 0.01 [14]. With this, the rate of successful
transmission per day is 1− (1− 0.01)7.6 = 0.0735.
If HCWs make 84 patient contacts per day [14], then the rate of transmission from
colonized patients to HCWs is βˆ1 = 84×0.152, where 0.152 is the probability of successful
contamination. For convenience, we assume that the probability of contamination is
double that for infected patients. However, since infected patients are only considered
to be truly infectious for 7 days (before they move to isolation, in the case of the models
with control strategies), the true rate is given as βˆ2 = 0.304 × 7/16 × 84 = 11.17. For
the baseline model, which lacks an isolation compartment, corresponding adjustments
would have to be made when computing these parameters.
1/δ gives the average time an HCW remains contaminated. Because data for this
term is either lacking or varies greatly (e.g. an HCW can become decontaminated by
merely washing his hands or an HCW can be colonized with MRSA for weeks at a time),
we computed δ numerically based on the findings of Albrich and Harbarth (2008), who
found that average MRSA carriage amongst HCWs is around 4.6% [1]. The value of δ
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varies between models in accordance with this figure. The models with control strategies,
for example, will have lower values of δ than the baseline model as the existence of an IU
restricts contamination of HCWs. For the model with screening at admission, δ = 48.23
day−1, while for the model with screening at discharge, δ = 50 day−1. For the baseline
model, δ was determined to be δ = 108 day−1. The reason for the value of δ being
large for the baseline model is due to the fact that the model lacks any means of patient
isolation in the event of colonization/infection, and thus infected patients are infectious
for the entire duration of their stay in the hospital.
γZ and µZ are assumed to be averages of the discharge/treatment and death rates,
respectively, of colonized and infected patients. That is, γZ =
γI + γC
2
and µZ =
µI + µC
2
. The term κ represents the rate at which patients develop MRSA infection
while in the hospital, are identified as having MRSA, and are subsequently isolated.
Assuming a 4.5-day incubation period, followed by a 2.5-day period for culture and
susceptibility testing, our value of κ comes out to 0.13. This value is close to the value
of 0.14 used by [3]. Since patients who develop infection are identified and isolated over
the span of 7 days and are assumed to stay in the hospital for 16 days, each transmission
rate concerning infected patients is multiplied by a factor of 7/16, as they are assumed
to be no longer infectious in isolation. Note that this only applies to the models where
a control strategy is present.
k represents the number of times more likely that a flagged patient is to be readmitted
to the hospital as compared to an unflagged patient. Stochastic simulations revealed that
regardless of our value of k, the rate of patient admission from the flagged compartment
would approach a stable equilibrium. This follows intuitively from the fact that, for large
k, F will become small quickly and remain small for t→∞. On the other hand, if k is
small, F will remain large and remain so for all t. The death rate for either community
compartment is just the average lifespan of an individual in the United States, and
the birth rate of the unflagged compartment is chosen so that the population of the
community is asymptotically constant.
3 Analysis
For each model we calculate an adjusted reproduction number using the next generation
matrix method [11]. We then perform a sensitivity analysis to determine the extent
to which each parameter affects this value, and conclude by looking at the endemic
equilibria of our models.
3.1 Reproduction Number Calculation
3.1.1 Baseline model
In either model, the HCW population NH is kept constant. Because of this constraint,
that can be expressed as H = NH − HC , only one from the two equations related to
HCWs is needed. For this analysis we used the equation describing HC population, that
is, the second equation in (1). To further simplify, the patient population NP in the
hospital is also kept constant. We do this by setting the rate of patients being admitted
per unit time, Λ, to be a function of the number of patients leaving the hospital,
Λ = ωUU + ωCC + ωII, (4)
where ωJ is the sum of the death (µJ) and discharge (γJ) rates of compartment J , i.e.,
ωJ = γJ + µJ . This leads to a second constraint, U = NP −C − I, that also lets us use
an equation less in (1).
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Table 1: Parameter definitions, values, and references
Parameter definition Parameter Values Reference
Total number of patients NP 600 N/A
Total number of HCWs NH 150 N/A
Colonized proportion of newly admitted patients λC 0.0374 [13]
Infected proportion of newly admitted patients λI 0.0067 [26]
Death rate of uncolonized patients µU 5.58x10−5 day−1 [16]
Death rate of colonized patients µC 8.25x10−5 day−1 [22]
Death rate of infected patients µI 4.87x10−4 day−1 [18]
Death rate of isolated patients µZ 2.85x10−4 day−1 estimated
Death rate of unflagged individuals µFU 3.48x10−5 day−1 N/A
Death rate of flagged individuals µF 3.48x10−5 day−1 N/A
Birth rate of community bFU 2.018 day−1 N/A
Discharge rate of uncolonized patients γU 0.189 day−1 [13]
Discharge rate of colonized patients γC 0.143 day−1 [10]
Treatment rate of infected patients γI 0.063 day−1 [12], [17], [8]
Treatment rate of isolated patients γZ 0.1015 day−1 estimated
Decontamination rate of HCWs δ varies [14]
Decolonization rate of colonized patients α 0.001 day−1 [22], [6]
Rate of progression from colonized to infected φ 0.04 day−1 [6]
Rate of progression from infected to isolated κ 0.13 day−1 estimated
Proportion of successful treatment τ 0.68 [23]
Screening proportion ρ varies N/A
The disease-free equilibrium (DFE) is obtained when the contaminated and infected
populations are zero, i.e. when we set
H∗C = C
∗ = I∗ = 0,
H∗ = NH ,
U∗ = NP .
(5)
For the system described by (1), a DFE does not exist when either λC > 0 or λI > 0.
If this were the case, then colonized and infected patients would be admitted at each
time step, forbidding the existence of a hospital state absent any contaminated patients.
Nonetheless, these parameters can be set to zero to allow insight into the spread of
MRSA bacteria within the hospital. That is, the model is simplified to consider the
case where all newly admitted patients are uncolonized (λI = λC = 0). By doing so we
were able to calculate an adjusted reproduction number, denoted by R0, for the baseline
model as explained hereunder.
We employed the next-generation matrix method [11, 30], in which the basic repro-
duction number is the largest eigenvalue, or spectral radius, of FV −1, where F and V
are the Jacobian matrices evaluated at the DFE of vectors F and V . Specifically, F
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Table 2: Transmission rates, values, and references for the models with screening
Parameter definition Parametersymbol
Parameter
values Reference
Rate of patient colonization after contact
w/colonized patients β1 0.27 day−1 [14], [9]
Rate of patient colonization after contact
w/contaminated HCWs β2 0.0735 day−1 [14]
Rate of patient colonization after contact
w/infected patients β3 0.03 day−1 [12]
Rate of HCW contamination after contact
w/colonized patients βˆ1 12.77 day−1 [14], [28]
Rate of HCW contamination after contact
w/infected patients βˆ2 11.17 day−1 estimated
is a vector whose entries are terms that account for newly contaminated patients and
contaminated HCWs. Newly sick individuals enter either the contaminated HCW com-
partment, HC , or the colonized patient compartment, C. Whereas, V contains terms
corresponding to transitions and outflow of patients and HCWs from these compart-
ments. Thus, using the next-generation matrix method, we find that
F =

βˆ1
C(NH−HC)
N + βˆ2
I(NH−HC)
N
β1
C(NP−C−I)
N + β2
HC(NP−C−I)
N + β3
I(NP−C−I)
N
0

and
V =

δHc
(α+ φ+ ωC)C
ωII − φC
 .
The F and V matrices are then
F =

0 βˆ1NHN
βˆ2NH
N
β2NP
N
β1NP
N
β3NP
N
0 0 0
 and V =

δ 0 0
0 α+ φ+ ωC 0
0 −φ ωI

Each element nij of the next-generation matrix is the average number of new colo-
nized or infected individuals of the ith compartment produced by the interaction with
or progression from individuals of the jth compartment, at each time step. For example,
the first element is zero because we assumed that HCWs could not contaminate each
other. Proceeding with our calculations,
FV −1 =

0
N∗H(βˆ2φ+βˆ1ωI)
(α+φ+ωC)ωI
N∗H βˆ2
ωI
N∗P β2
δ
N∗P (β3φ+β1ωI)
(α+φ+ωC)ωI
N∗P β3
ωI
0 0 0
 . (6)
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where NP ∗ = NP /N and NH∗ = NH/N . The reproduction number of the adjusted
system can thus be calculated as:
R0 =
1
2
N∗P (β3φ+ β1ωI)
(α+ φ+ ωC)ωI
+
1
2
√√√√(N∗P (β3φ+ β1ωI)
(α+ φ+ ωC)ωI
)2
+ 4
(
N∗H(βˆ2φ+ βˆ1ωI)
(α+ φ+ ωC)ωI
)(
N∗Pβ2
δ
)
.
(7)
Equivalently, we can represent the reproduction number as
R0 =
1
2
(
RP +
√
R2P + 4 ·R2H
)
(8)
where RP is the colonization/infection potential of patients and RH is the contamination
potential of HCWs. These two values represent processes occurring simultaneously:
a direct transmission between patients and a two-step cycle of transmission between
patients and HCWs.
RH is the geometric mean of (1) the average number of new HCWs contaminated
per colonized/infected patient and (2) the average number of new patients colonized
per contaminated HCW. The first of these factors has two terms, each accounting for
different transmission pathways: one direct (HCWs being contaminated by colonized
patients) and other indirect (HCWs being contaminated by infected patients). This
term is
RH =
√√√√N∗H
(
βˆ1
α+ φ+ ωC
+
φ
α+ φ+ ωC
· βˆ2
ωI
)(
N∗Pβ2
δ
)
. (9)
Rewriting the expression for RP , we find that it is the average number of newly col-
onized patients as result of contacts with other colonized patients. As in the first factor
of RH , the expression for RP includes two modes of spread: direct spread characterized
by colonized patient transmission, and indirect spread characterized by infected patient
transmission. Thus,
RP = N
∗
P
(
β1
α+ φ+ ωC
+
φ
α+ φ+ ωC
· β3
ωI
)
. (10)
Furthermore, since RH , RP > 0, we have from (8) that:
R0 =
RP
2
+
1
2
√
R2P + 4R
2
H >
RP
2
+
1
2
√
R2P = RP . (11)
Applying the triangle inequality, we also find that:
R0 =
RP
2
+
1
2
√
R2P + 4R
2
H <
RP
2
+
1
2
(RP + 2RH) = RP +RH . (12)
Combining these results, we can say that, in general, RP < R0 < RP + RH . The
latter part of this inequality means that the two infection potentials, RP and RH , have a
net effect (given by the adjusted reproduction number, R0) which is less than their sum.
This is explained by the fact that patients are capable of transmitting MRSA to both
patients and HCWs, while HCWs can only transmit MRSA to patients, and not to other
HCWs. Recall that, as no new infected or colonized patients are being admitted into
the system, this adjusted reproduction number accounts only for the spread of MRSA
within hospital facilities absent colonized/infected patient admission.
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3.1.2 Screening at Admission
As before, we set
Λ = (γU + µU )U + (γC + µC)C + µII + (γZ + µZ)Z,
so as to achieve a constant in-hospital population. At the DFE we have
HC
∗ = C∗ = I∗ = Z∗ = 0,
H∗ = NH ,
U∗ = NP .
(13)
Once again, the system can be simplified by making the substitutions H = NH − HC
and U = NP −U −C− I−Z. For convenience, let Σ = C+ I+Z, so that U = NP −Σ.
Using the next-generation matrix approach, we obtain:
F =

βˆ1
C(NH−HC)
N + βˆ2
I(NH−HC)
N
β1
C(NP−Σ)
N + β2
HC(NP−Σ)
N + β3
I(NP−Σ)
N
0
 and V =

δHC
C(ωC + φ+ α)
I(µI + κ)− φC
 ,
which yields
F =

0 βˆ1N
∗
H βˆ2N
∗
H
β2N
∗
P β1N
∗
P β3N
∗
P
0 0 0
 and V =

δ 0 0
0 α+ ωC + φ 0
0 −φ κ+ µI
 .
The next-generation matrix is then
FV −1 =

0
N∗H [βˆ1(κ+µI)+βˆ2φ]
(κ+µI)(α+µC+γC+φ)
N∗H βˆ2
κ+µI
N∗P β2
δ
N∗P [β1(κ+µI)+β3φ]
(κ+µI)(α+µC+γC+φ)
N∗P β3
κ+µI
0 0 0
 . (14)
The basic reproduction number has the same form as (8) and satisfies (11) and (12).
RP and RH are given by
RP = N
∗
P
(
β1
α+ µC + γC + φ
+
φ
α+ µC + γC + φ
· β3
κ+ µI
)
(15)
and
RH =
√√√√N∗H
(
βˆ1
α+ µC + γC + φ
+
φ
α+ µC + γC + φ
· βˆ2
κ+ µI
)
N∗Pβ2
δ
, (16)
respectively. The difference between the baseline reproduction number and the repro-
duction numbers for the screening models is the introduction of the rate κ, which is the
rate of progression of infected patients to the isolation unit. Note also that the discharge
rate γI , which was implicit in the ωI rate, is excluded. A clear disadvantage of setting
λC = λI = 0 in the analysis is that the screening parameter ρ does not appear in the
expression for the adjusted reproduction number. The adjusted reproduction number
here is the same as that found for the model with screening at discharge.
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of the adjusted reproduction number R0 with respect to
some parameters for (A) the baseline model and (B) the models with screening strategies.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis of R0
3.2.1 Baseline model
For the sensitivity analysis, we assumed that the parameters were obtained from normal
distributions. Local sensitivity indices are estimated from the partial derivatives of
R0. That is, a 1% change in the specified parameter yields the given percent change
in R0 (see Figure 4). Figure 4 summarizes the indices of sensitivity for the adjusted
reproduction number of the baseline model, as it appears in equation (7). As one can
see, the parameters to which R0 is most sensitive are the rate of transmission between
uncolonized and colonized patients (β1) and the discharge rate of colonized patients
(γC).
In our baseline model there are several mechanisms by which an uncolonized pa-
tient may become colonized with MRSA. This sensitivity analysis proves that the most
important mechanism to mitigate is direct/indirect colonization via other colonized pa-
tients. The parameter γC summarizes the flow out from the colonized compartment
due to treatment or discharge. This means that as more colonized patients leave the
hospital, net MRSA transmission rate drops. In the baseline model, only these two
parameters exhibited significant effects on R0 when changed by small amounts. The
remaining parameters produced negligible effects on R0.
The time it takes for a contaminated HCW to become decontaminated can vary
between 6 hours and 24 days [14], and it can be seen in Figure 5A that the adjusted
reproduction number of the baseline model is always greater than 1 for any of these
values of δ. This means that reducing the decontamination rate can decrease the value
of the adjusted reproduction number, but it is never enough to prevent an outbreak in
the absence of any other control effort. Small changes in δ produce negligible effects on
outbreak likelihood, as shown by our sensitivity analysis.
3.2.2 Screening at admission and discharge
For the models with screening at admission and discharge, the same sensitivity analysis
was performed. Once again we found that β1 and γC were the most influential param-
eters (see Figure 4B). A more careful analysis was performed for other parameters of
interest. In the screening models, 1/κ denotes the average time it takes for an infected
patient to move to isolation. To determine how both κ and δ affected the reproduction
number in the models with screening, the latter was graphed as a function of either
variable. The results are shown in Figure 5B. We found that when reducing only δ and
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AB
Figure 5: (A) The adjusted reproduction number R0 of the baseline model is shown with
respect to the decontamination rate of HCWs, δ. The adjusted reproduction number is
always bigger than R0 ≈ 1.26 (dotted line). (B) The adjusted reproduction number of
the screening models is shown as a function of the decontamination rate of HCWs, δ,
and the rate at which infected patients move to isolation, κ. Note that R0 > 1 for all
values of δ and κ plotted.
κ, it is always the case that R0 > 1. Therefore, in order to reduce the prevalence of
MRSA in hospitals, it is not sufficient to only ensure that HCWs are adhering to hygiene
policies and screening patients regularly for MRSA infection - it is necessary to control
for other parameters.
Other model parameters were analyzed similarly (not shown). For δ > 5 day−1,
β1 < 0.21 day−1 ensures that the reproduction number is less than 1. If δ ≤ 5 day−1,
however, this may not be sufficient in order to prevent endemicity of MRSA in the
system. A similar phenomenon can be observed with the parameter γC . This indicates
that as long as competent hygiene policies are enforced, an endemic free system can be
achieved so long as β1, γC < 0.2 day−1 in a system with screening (i.e. strict precautions
are taken when contacting colonized patients and colonized patients are treated as soon
as possible, ideally at a rate of 1 in every 5 days).
3.3 Endemic Equilibria
The endemic equilibrium corresponds to a steady state where the disease remains in the
population [5]. The high level of complexity associated with our model does not allow us
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to find a closed form solution for the endemic equilibria, hence results were found using
numerical methods. In order to find the endemic equilibria of the baseline and screening
models, we reduced the system of equilibrium conditions to one algebraic equation with
one variable and to two algebraic equations with two variables, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the solutions to these resulting equations in terms of the screen-
ing proportion ρ. For screening proportions below 60%, screening at patient discharge
produced marginally better endemic conditions than screening at patient admission.
Although endemic conditions were more favorable for the model with screening at dis-
charge, the isolated patient population was much larger than in the model with screening
at admission. For higher screening proportions, screening at patient admission produced
better endemic conditions. For all but the highest screening proportions (ρ > 0.8), con-
taminated HCW and infected patient populations were very similar in size for either
screening model.
��
�
�
�
��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
�
��
���
���
ρ [���-�]
��
���
����
��
��
���
����
���
Figure 6: Population sizes at the endemic equilibrium as ρ varies. The solid lines
correspond to screening at admission, whereas the dotted lines correspond to screening
at discharge.
Figure 7A presents the sum of colonized patients, infected patients, and contaminated
HCWs as a function of parameters ρ and δ for the model with screening at admission.
We shall refer to this sum as the contaminated population. Sufficiently large values of δ
(δ > 10 day−1) produced little overall influence on the contaminated population when
compared to ρ.
The same comparison was made for the model with screening at discharge in Figure
7B. There was little difference between screening models in how the parameter δ affected
the contaminated population. Interestingly, even for very high screening proportions,
the contaminated population in the model with discharge screening was still greater
than 100. This is a consequence of the mechanism of screening, as discharge screening
does not stop individuals colonized or infected with MRSA from entering the hospital.
For higher values of ρ the model with screening at admission produced more favorable
results, indicated by a smaller contaminated population.
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Figure 7: Contaminated patient population as a function of screening proportion (ρ)
and the decolonization rate of contaminated HCWs (δ) for the model with screening at
(A) admission and (B) discharge.
3.4 Results
We developed and analyzed three models of nosocomial MRSA transmission to evaluate
the superior screening strategy. Popular hospital practice favors screening at admission,
while screening at discharge had yet to be tested. We modeled each system using a
system of nonlinear differential equations. We found that, for screening values of ρ < 0.6
(i.e. less than 60% of new/outgoing patients are screened at admission/discharge),
screening at discharge produced marginally better results in the form of a smaller overall
colonized patient population. For ρ < 0.6, the effect of either control strategy on the
infected patient population was nearly equivalent. For ρ > 0.6, on the other hand,
screening at admission was the better screening method, as it better controlled both
colonized and infected patient populations. For all values ρ > 0, screening at discharge
yielded more isolated patients than the alternative control strategy, suggesting cost
limitations.
4 Discussion
MRSA prevalence in hospital facilities is a concern of increasing priority since it jeopar-
dizes the health of patients and health care workers alike. However, MRSA cannot be
treated exclusively with antibiotics due to the very realistic possibility of further resis-
tant strains. Thus, control strategies and protocols should be emphasized in health care
facilities so as to control bacterial spread and further proliferation. Screening followed
by isolation is a very common method of controlling MRSA. Of practical consideration is
the most effective means of screening. Here we evaluated the effectiveness of discharge
screening as compared to the typical alternative of admission screening. In order to
compare the two proposed strategies for MRSA control in hospitals, we evaluated three
compartmental models: a baseline model and two models for either screening strategy.
The difference in the design of the models is intended to answer questions otherwise not
addressed in the current literature regarding patients leaving hospitals and the effect on
MRSA transmission dynamics in hospitals.
Screening at discharge appears to be the more effective strategy in reducing endemic
populations within a hospital for lower screening percentages. Although common prac-
tice prefers screening at admission, our results show that, for screening percentages below
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60%, screening at discharge is more effective in reducing colonized patient populations
within a hospital. For the same range of screening percentages, the infected patient and
contaminated HCW populations were nigh indistinguishable (differences in equilibria
were insignificant). However, discharge screening also yields a very rapid growth in the
number of isolated patients, suggesting that the strategy may not be entirely practi-
cal if considering an IU with limited capacity. For screening percentages greater than
60%, screening at admission performed better overall, yielding lower equilibria for both
the colonized and infected patient populations. Contaminated HCW populations were
once again indistinguishable between models for higher values of ρ. We also made a
continuous-time Markov chain version for each of the three models to test the effects of
stochasticity, the results of which (not shown) mirrored those shown for the deterministic
models.
Some areas of further research and elaboration remain. The most significant of which
includes an isolation unit (IU) with finite capacity (e.g. 20 beds). This consideration
would clarify the practicality of discharge screening and resolve the issue of whether
or not the growth in the number of isolated patients can be accommodated. Another
important consideration is cost. Although we can mathematically express the results
of the above models in a concise and simple manner, the true pragmatism must be
evaluated in terms of cost. A significant problem associated with controlling MRSA is
the cost it incurs in treatment and various methods to prevent its spread. These results
might guide policy makers to improve control strategies, but a detailed cost analysis
might produce more sound results. In performing our research, parameter values were
chosen conservatively so as to provide a lower bound for any results later on.
As mentioned earlier, we made the common assumption that patients and HCWs
mix homogeneously, and that our patient and HCW populations were constant. To give
a more detailed description of heterogeneous mixing would require significantly more
data on HCW-patient contact patterns than is presently available.
Parameters were taken, for the most part, from primary sources and various pa-
pers discussing MRSA endemic dynamics. A more exhaustive analysis could include
confidence intervals and hypothesis testing.
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